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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MINNESOTA: A SEARCH
FOR PATTERNS
JAMES R. PIELEMEIERt
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court fiequently has stated that the
moving party has the burden of demonstrating clearly the nonexistence of a
genuine issue of material fact on a motion for summary judgmen, Profes-
sor Pielemeier's analysis of recent Minnesota decisions indicates that the
extent of that burden differs depending on whether the moving party or the
party opposing the motion will have the burden of proof on dispositive
issues at trial Professor Pielemeier identifies four paradigm situations in
which motions for summary judgment typically are made andprovides the
analyticalfiamework to aid both litigants and courts in determining when
summary disposition is warranted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To make a successful Rule 56 motion for summary judgment' is
t Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. A.B., J.D., Indi-
ana University, Bloomington.
1. MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.01-.07.
Summary judgment procedure first appeared in England in 1855. Summary Proce-
dure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67. The law permitting the proce-
dure was enacted in response to economic and social pressures from mercantile groups
who desired a more efficient method for enforcing and collecting debts than was available
in the common law and chancery courts. Bauman, The Evolution of the Sumnmay Judgment
Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 330-31, 338 (1956). Initially the procedure was limited to
creditor-debtor ,ctions. Id. at 339-40. Despite this original limitation, summary judg-
ment procedure was soon extended to include all but a few types of actions. Id. at 339-40.
Currently in England, the procedure is not generally used in personal injury and road
accident cases. Id. at 341-42.
Summary judgment procedure in the United States had its source in the English
practice. Id. at 343. While a few states had adopted summary judgment procedures prior
to adoption of FED. R. Civ. P. 56 in 1938, the general trend toward adoption of summary
judgment procedure postdated the federal rule. Bauman, supra, at 351; Clark, The Sum-
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one of the most difficult challenges that Minnesota attorneys face.
While the basic standard for judging these motions is relatively
clear,2 inconsistent cases 3 and supreme court language requiring
rigorous standards of proof4 make any summary judgment motion
a chancy proposition at best, even though the case may be clear
cut in the attorneys' minds. 'For example, in Rossman v. 740 River
Drwve,5 a negligence action was brought against a landlord for
property loss allegedly arising from his failure to adequately main-
tain an apartruent complex security system. Defendant moved for
summary judgment on the ground that an exculpatory provision
in the lease precluded a negligence action. Both parties agreed
that there was no dispute of material fact and that the validity of
the exculpatory clause was the sole issue before the court. 6 The
district court granted summary judgment for defendant and plain-
tiff appealed. On appeal, both parties again represented that all
facts necessary to determine the validity of the exculpatory clause
in a negligence action were before the court.7 Notwithstanding
maqyJudgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 571 (1952). Initially, a constitutional question re-
garding denial of the right to trial by jury impeded use of the motion for summary
judgment. The constitutional issue was settled in Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920),
in which the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial did not extend to cases in
which there were no issues of fact to be determined. Prior to adoption of the federal rule,
however, reluctance to use summary judgment procedure remained because of the diffi-
culty in determining whether a particular case fit the rather limited application of the
procedure. See 3 D. MCFARLAND & W. KEPPEL, MINNESOTA CIVIL PRACTICE § 1651, at
231-32 (1979). By 1952 30 states had adopted some form of summary judgment proce-
dure. See Clark, supra, at 568.
Patterned after the federal rule, MINN. R. Civ. P. 86.01 (original version at Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56, 278 Minn. 70 (1968)) was adopted in 1951, effective January 1, 1952. 232
Minn. vii (1951). The Minnesota rule avoided the problem of applicability because it
extended to all civil actions, both legal and equitable. See Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn.
303, 313-14, 110 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1961); Clark, supra, at 569. There have been no constitu-
tional challenges of the Minnesota rule. The basic purpose of the Minnesota summary
judgment rule is the same as the early English and American rules: "to afford procedure
for the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of actions where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Lindgren v. Sparks, 239 Minn. 222, 225, 58 N.W.2d 317, 319-20 (1953). See Delgado v,
Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979); Vieths v. Thorp Fin. Co., 305 Minn. 522,
524-25, 232 N.W.2d 776, 778 (1975); AhIm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 262-63, 143 N.W.2d
65, 68 (1966).
2. See note 25 infa and accompanying text.
3. See notes 73-82 infia and accompanying text.
4. See note 22 infia and accompanying text.
5. 308 Minn. 134, 241 N.W.2d 91 (1976).
6. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at A-19.
7. 308 Minn. at 136, 241 N.W.2d at 92; Respondent's Brief at 18, 20. Cf. Appel-
lant's Brief and Appendix at 29 (only issues of fact pertained to misrepresentation and
breach of warranty theories). Plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial court erred in
[Vol. 7
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/10
SUMMARYJUDGMENT IN MINNESOTA
these stipulations, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case for development of facts necessary to a finding of
causal negligence.
8
Decisions of this nature appear to justify the somewhat cynical
belief of some attorneys that as a practical matter the Minnesota
summary judgment rule is nonexistent. At the least, the utility of
these motions as viewed by the bench and bar is controverted. A
survey conducted for the purposes of this Article9 indicates that
while the majority of responding Minnesota attorneys and district
court judges feel that the Minnesota Supreme Court's attitude to-
ward summary judgment is "about right,"' 0 over three-fourths of
the responding attorneys believe that district court judges deny
too many summary judgment motions" and that many district
court judges deny summary judgment as a matter of course.' 2 Be-
dismissing her entire complaint. She asserted that the motion had been one for partial
summary judgment on her negligence claim only, and was not intended to place in issue
her contentions that defendant was liable on theories of misrepresentation and breach of
warranty, notwithstanding the exculpatory clause. See id. at 27-30.
8. 308 Minn. at 138, 241 N.W.2d at 93. Michael Scherschligt, Associate Professor of
Law at Hamline University School of Law, was one of the attorneys for defendant in
Rossman. Professor Scherschligt related to this writer that "[the] attorneys for both parties
concluded that further investigation into the facts would be unduly expensive and possibly
fruitless. Accordingly, they felt the best manner to efficiently dispose of what was at least
the threshold issue in the lawsuit was to obtain summary judgment on the legal validity of
the exculpatory clause based on facts that had been determined at the time of the mo-
tion. . . . [B]oth parties viewed the matter as essentially constituting cross-motions for
summary judgment on the validity of the exculpatory clause in a negligence action. ...."
Interview with Michael V. Scherschligt, Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University
School of Law (Nov. 19, 1980) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
9. In August 1980 questionnaires on summary judgment were mailed to 50 Minne-
sota district court judges and 50 Minnesota attorneys. See note 85 thfra nd accompanying
text. Thirty-two judges (64%) and 26 attorneys (52%) responded. Se note 86 infa. The
Minnesota summary judgment questionnaire and survey responses are printed in the Ap-
pendix to this Article.
10. See Appendix, Judge's Form, Question J-7 (81% of responding judges agreed with
statement in text); id., Attorney's Form, Question A-8 (55% of responding attorneys agreed
with statement in text).
11. See id., Attorney's Form, Question A-9A (82% of responding attorneys agreed with
statement in text).
12. See id., Attorney's Form, Question A-I 1A (81% of responding attorneys agreed
with statement in text). Cf id, Judge's Form, Question J-12 (35% of responding judges
agreed with statement in text). But see id., Question J-9 (94% of responding judges report
they always read supporting and opposing memoranda before deciding summary judg-
ment motions; remainder of responding judges report they usually do so).
It is possible that careful review of the record may be a factor in the denial of many
summary judgment motions. Half of the responding judges indicated that even when the
parties stipulate that there is no genuine issue of fact, they still intend to examine counsel
and the record to determine whether any material issues of fact were overlooked. See id.,
Question J-4C (52% of responding judges agreed with this statement). While judicial ac-
19811
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cause of the belief that judges are too inclined to deny these mo-
tions, half of the responding attorneys report that they do not
make summary judgment motions even when they believe as a
matter of law that the motion should be granted.' 3 Nearly one-
third of the responding attorneys conclude that summary judg-
ment procedure in Minnesota is "generally useless."' 4
In contrast, over half of the responding district court judges
favor summary judgment as a useful time-saving tool to weed out
frivolous cases,' 5 although one-third of them assert that the rule is
markedly overused and misused by attorneys.' 6 One-fourth of the
responding judges believe that more often than not, attorneys
bring summary judgment motions to increase the ultimate expense
of the litigation to their clients and thereby benefit themselves
financially.' 7 Over one-third of the responding judges believe that
at least half of the time, attorneys bring summary judgment mo-
tions simply to show their clients they are "doing something."',,
While these survey responses reflect disparities between judges'
opinions of attorneys bringing summary judgment motions and at-
torneys' opinions of judges deciding them, both groups agree that
only a small percentage of the motions are granted at the trial
tivism in "finding" issues of fact in this manner may effectuate the most "just" result, it
may on the other hand result in a decision based upon less relevant facts or legal theories
that opposing counsel may have considered and rejected. As a practical matter, such judi-
cial activism undermines the philosophy that the adversary system is the most appropriate
manner by which to arrive at a proper resolution. In addition, it tends to ignore the
possibility that the parties entered into a stipulation because it was uneconomical to delve
deeper into the facts. Se Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. at 138, 241 N.W.2d at
93; note 8 supra; cf. Downes v. Beach, 587 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir. 1978) (trial court not
required to consider issues parties fail to raise on summary judgment motion).
13. See Appendix, Attorney's Form, Questions A-6, A-7. Cf. id., Question A-IIC
(40% of responding attorneys agreed that motion for summary judgment is waste of time
even when motion has merit as matter of law).
14. See id., Question A-IC (30% of responding attorneys agreed with statement in
text). Cf id., Judge's Form, Question J-IC (only 6% of responding judges agreed with
statement in text).
15. See id., Judge's Form, Question J- IA (55% of responding judges agreed with state-
ment in text).
16. See id., Question J-2A (32% of responding judges agreed with statement in text).
Cf id., Attorney's Form, Question A-5 (88% of responding attorneys report they rarely or
never make summary judgment motions when they have substantial doubt about its
merit).
17. Se id., Judge's Form, Question J-3B (24% of responding judges agreed with state-
ment in text).
18. See id., Question J-3F (37% of responding judges agreed with statement in text).
Cf id., Attorney's Form, Question A-12E (81% of responding attorneys report that show-
ing client they are "doing something" is never a motive in making motion for summary
judgment).
[Vol. 7
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court level.19 This may result in part from a lack of understanding
of the proper use of summary judgment procedure by attorneys
20
and in part from the great reluctance of trial court judges to grant
summary judgment motions in general. 2I This reluctance may
well be encouraged by strict supreme court language to the effect
that summary judgment should not be granted if there is "any
doubt" as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
22
While federal circuit court opinions have encouraged the use of
summary judgment in appropriate cases,23 that kind of encour-
19. Se id., Judge's Form, Question J-10 (32% of responding judges report that they
grant 10% or less of summary judgment motions made before them; 58% of responding
judges report that they grant 25% or less of summary judgment motions made before
them; 81% of responding judges report that they grant 50% or less of summary judgment
motions made before them; 100% of responding judges report that they grant 75% or less
of summary judgment motions made before them); id., Attorney's Form, Question A-3
(65% of responding attorneys report that 10% or less of their summary judgment motions
are granted by trial court; 77% of responding attorneys report that 25% or less of their
summary judgment motions are granted by trial court; 92% of responding attorneys report
that 50% or less of their summary judgment motions are granted by trial court; 100% of
responding attorneys report that 75% or less of their summary judgment motions are
granted by trial court).
20. See id., Judge's Form, Question J-I 1 (25% of responding judges believe that less
than 50% of attorneys have sufficient understanding of summary judgment rule to invoke
it in appropriate cases and make pertinent arguments).
21. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
22. Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974)
(emphasis added); cf. 3 D. McFARLAND & W. KEPPEL, .rupra note 1, § 1654, at 241 (Rath-
bun language more strict than standard apparently applied by Minnesota Supreme
Court).
23. See, e.g. , American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1980); Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam
Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977). In Delta Communications, the court stated:
In passing on motion for summary judgment, even where the underlying
facts are undisputed, it is hornbook law that the court must indulge every reason-
able inference from those facts in favor of the party opposing the motion. Insofar
as any weighing of inferences from given facts is permissible, the task of the court
is not to weigh these against each other but rather to cull the universe of possible
inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract stan-
dard of reasonableness, casting aside those which do not meet it and focusing
solely on those which do. If a frog be found in the party punch bowl, the pres-
ence of a mischievous guest-but not the occurrence of spontaneous genera-
tion-may reasonably be inferred.
590 F.2d at 101-02 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the ftnam court stated that in
reviewing the motion
all evidence and inferences therefrom are to be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. . . . Nevertheless, the opponents'
version of the facts must support a viable legal theory which would entitle them,
if accepted, to a judgment as a matter of law.
[ ..A]n opposing party may not defeat a summary judgment motion, once
the movant has met his burden, in the absence of "any significant probative
evidence tending to support the complaint." . . . To hold otherwise would give
1981]
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agement is notably lacking in Minnesota Supreme Court opinions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, summary judgment has been af-
firmed in several recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases, although
the rationale and supporting documentation was not always
clearly stated. The purpose of this Article is to identify the under-
lying patterns in Minnesota summary judgment decisions and to
set forth an approach to aid both litigants and courts in determin-
ing when summary disposition is warranted. This Article will re-
view the basic operation of Minnesota Rule 56 and its relation to
the discovery process, and discuss whether the ultimate burden of
proof at trial should affect how a court views the motion. Recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on summary judgment will
be categorized into four paradigms, and focusing on what the
court has done as opposed to what it has merely said, the Article
will suggest which of these paradigms appear to be most appropri-
ate for summary resolution.
II. THE OPERATION OF RULE 56 AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO DISCOVERY
A primary purpose of the summary judgment rule is to allow a
party who is faced with a claim or defense that has no substance in
law or fact to avoid the delay and expense of unfounded litiga-
tion.2 4 To effect this purpose, the basic standard for summary
judgment in Minnesota requires that it be "rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ' '25
free rein to any plaintiff who can draft an antitrust complaint capable of with-
standing a motion to dismiss to go to trial with only a wing and a prayer sup-
porting his well drafted complaint.
553 F.2d at 624.
24. When the alleged claims or defenses have no basis in fact, summary judgment
provides a means by which further litigation can be short-circuited. See 3 D. McFARLAND
& W. KEPPEL, supra note 1, § 1651, at 231 & nn.48-49; note 1 supra.
25. MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Rule 56.03 was carefully drafted. See Clark, supra note 1,
at 571 (Minnesota rule was based on federal rule). In Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482,
485, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1955), the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the words of
Rule 56.03 "need no amplification since they speak for themselves."
The terms "genuine issue" and "material fact" have been clearly defined by the Min-
nesota court. Attempts at substitution of alternative standards or definitions have been
unsuccessful. A genuine issue is one that is not "so frivolous and so insubstantial that it
would be futile to try [it)." A &J Builders Inc. v. Harms, 288 Minn. 124, 133, 179 N.W.2d
98, 103 (1970). See also Whisler v. Findeisen, 280 Minn. 454, 456, 160 N.W.2d 153, 155
[Vol. 7
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/10
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MINNESOTA
The logical starting point in determining the propriety of mak-
ing or granting a motion for summary judgment is to examine the
issues raised in the pleadings. For example, if a complaint fails to
include all allegations required to state a claim as a matter of sub-
stantive law or if the answer admits all essential allegations of the
complaint and sets forth no affirmative defenses, judgment on the
pleadings may be appropriate, 26 but these situations are rare. 27 A
more typical situation may be characterized by the following hy-
pothetical: the complaint alleges facts A, B, and C, all of which
are required to state a claim as a matter of substantive law; the
answer admits fact A, denies or is deemed under the rules to
deny 28 facts B and C, and sets forth as an affirmative defense fact
D, to which no reply is required and that is deemed to be denied
by the plaintiff under the rules. 29 In this hypothetical, facts B, C,
and D are in dispute. Fact A need not be considered on motion
for summary judgment, except perhaps by way of a recitation that
it is not in dispute.
In this hypothetical, more options are available to the defend-
ant on a motion for summary judgment than to the plaintiff. The
defendant theoretically can succeed on the motion by showing
there is no dispute regarding the nonexistence of either fact B or C, or
by showing there is no dispute regarding the existence of fact D. If
(1968). A material fact is one whose resolution will affect the result or outcome of the case.
Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1976) (per curiam); Rath-
bun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 229, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974).
26. See Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 412, 75 N.W.2d 206,
209 (1956) (when motion for summary judgment is decided on sufficiency of pleadings to
state cause of action, it should be considered as 12.03 motion for judgment on the plead-
ings).
27. See Jacobson v. Rauenhorst Corp., 301 Minn. 202, 206, 221 N.W.2d 703, 706
(1974) (if counterclaim or affirmative defense does not raise material issue of fact, plain-
tiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted; contractual provision relied
on as third-party defense interpreted as matter of law in favor of third-party plaintiff),
overuled in part on other grounds, Farmington Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Fischer Sand &
Aggregate, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 838,842 n.4 (Minn. 1979); Bailey v. University of Minn., 290
Minn. 359, 187 N.W.2d 702 (1971) (relief sought against Board of Regents unavailable
because decree or judgment would be incapable of terminating the controversy); O'Brien
v. Kemper, 276 Minn. 202, 149 N.W.2d 487 (1967) (when defense of fraud stricken noth-
ing was left in the answer but admissions of plaintiff's claim, motion for judgment on the
pleadings was properly granted); Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 290-91, 69
N.W.2d 667, 670 (1955) (portion of complaint pleading fraud without the particularity
required held insufficient and subject to dismissal); Wallner v. Schmitz, 239 Minn. 93, 97,
57 N.W.2d 821, 824 (1953) (complaint alleging release obtained by duress subject to dis-
missal absent allegations of particular facts constituting duress).
28. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 8.02 (allegations of lack of knowledge have effect of denial).
29. Id. 7.01, 8.04.
19811
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the defendant succeeds in proving any one of these three matters
and the plaintiff does not effectively counter this proof, the only
conclusion to be drawn is that the plaintiff does not have the evi-
dence to back up the claim or that the defendant has a conclusive
defense regardless of what the plaintiff proves. Accordingly, sum-
mary judgment should be entered for the defendant. Under the
hypothetical, it is more difficult for the plaintiff to succeed on his
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff must show there is no dis-
pute regarding the existence of both facts . and Cand the nonexistence
of fact D. Even if these requirements are met, the defendant can
defeat plaintiff's motion by presenting evidence showing a genuine
dispute as to the existence or nonexistence of only one of these facts.
One way of proving or disputing the existence or nonexistence
of a fact on motion for summary judgment is by affidavit. Rule
56.05 requires affidavits to set forth facts that are admissible into
evidence and to show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matter attested. 30 Accordingly, an affidavit generally
must reflect personal first-hand knowledge.3' Usually the party
who has or is in control of witnesses with first-hand knowledge of
pertinent facts will submit affidavits in support of or in opposition
to a summary judgment motion. The party who does not have or
control these witnesses or admissible documentary evidence may
be forced to use discovery to support or contest the motion. Rule
56.03 specifically provides for the use of depositions, interrogatory
answers, and admissions in support of or in opposition to a sum-
mary judgment motion. 32 These devices can be used to obtain in-
formation on specific facts supporting the allegations in the
pleadings and the evidence marshalled to establish those facts. At
times, responses to discovery may disclose that the evidence is non-
existent or insufficient as a matter of law to support the necessary
allegations in the pleadings, thereby providing the evidentiary ba-
sis for a summary judgment motion.
The rules in effect require a party who cannot supply affidavits
in opposition to a sufficiently supported summary judgment mo-
tion to use information obtained through discovery to support his
30. Id. 56.05.
31. Peterson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 482, 487-88, 160 N.W.2d
541, 544-45 (1968); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 420-21, 92
N.W.2d 96, 98 (1958); MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.05; 3 D. McFARLAND & W. KEPPEL, supra
note 1, § 1656, at 245-46.
32. MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.03.
[Vol. 7
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opposition. 33 An opposing party may not rest on mere averments
or denials in his pleadings successfully to oppose the motion.
34
Rather, facts impeaching the veracity of proof supporting the mo-
tion must be presented by the time the ruling on the motion is
made.3 5 Often the only way to obtain these facts is through dis-
covery.36  Accordingly, courts construing the federal summary
judgment rule require the party opposing a sufficiently supported
motion not only to assert the need to use further discovery to post-
pone an immediate ruling against him, but also to demonstrate
affirmatively why discovery has not already been used to obtain
the necessary opposing material. Moreover, the opposing party
must show how postponement of a ruling will enable that party-
by discovery or other means-to rebut the moving party's showing
of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
3 7
The policy behind the rules and decisions just discussed is clear.
Generally, evidence submitted on a motion for summary judgment
must be equivalent in testamentary value to that which the parties
anticipate presenting at trial.38 If the evidence supporting the mo-
33. See id. 56.06.
34. Id. 56.05. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the party
opposing the motion may not "create a fact issue by claiming that the facts which may be
developed on cross-examination at the time of trial will permit him to reach the trier of
facts." County of Hennepin v. Mikulay, 292 Minn. 200, 204, 194 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979); Erickson v. Gen-
eral United Life Ins. Co., 256 N.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Minn. 1977); Manpower, Inc. v. Best
Temporaries, Inc., 293 Minn. 369, 370-71, 196 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1972) (per curiam); Vos-
beck v. Lerdall, 245 Minn. 164, 167-68, 72 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1955).
36. For example, if the defendant is the only party with first-hand knowledge of the
existence or nonexistence of a fact essential to the plaintiff's case (such as defendant's state
of mind when the allegedly wrongful act occurred) and the defendant denies the existence
of that fact by way of affidavit, plaintiff may show that there is indeed a factual dispute by
confronting the defendant at a deposition with evidence casting doubt upon the truth of
the denial. Any evasive testimony given by defendant as well as any other impeaching
circumstantial evidence (frequently obtained through discovery) may be submitted in op-
position to the summary judgment motion. Cf. Forsblad v. Jepson, 292 Minn. 458, 195
N.W.2d 429 (1972) (per curiam) (denial by defendant that he had notice of alleged fraud
not sufficiently impeached by depositions to justify denial of summary judgment).
37. See Walters v. City of Ocean Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980); Lamb's
Patio Theater, Inc. v. Universal Film Exch., 582 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1978); Beckers
v. International Snowmobile Indus. Ass'n, 581 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 986 (1979); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Norton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289,
297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
38. This is the case with respect to affidavits that must be made on personal knowl-
edge. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. The fruits of discovery may not al-
ways qualify as admissible evidence. However, because interrogatory answers and a
party's depositions are made under oath, MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.03, 31.02, 33.01(4), and
admissions are deemed binding, id. 36.02, the fruits of these discovery devices may be
1981)
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tion is sufficient to establish-absent conflicting evidence-the
existence or nonexistence of a crucial fact, the party opposing the
motion must demonstrate at this pretrial stage what evidence he
would present at trial to justify a contrary conclusion.3 9 To be
successful at trial, the opposing party would be required to present
this evidence or face certain defeat. If the opposing party is unable
to show the evidence exists at this pretrial stage, notwithstanding
the available discovery devices, he should not be permitted to put
the court and nU-oving party through the time and expense of fur-
ther litigation based on what can only been seen as speculation
that some favorable evidence may surface. Thus, summary judg-
ment can be viewed as the time the opposing party must "show his
cards," if in fact he has any, to justify further expenditure of time,
money, and judicial resources.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The discussion in Part II illustrates that proof in support of and
in opposition to a summary judgment motion is essentially
equivalent to that which the parties anticipate presenting at trial,
deemed admissions by a party opponent pursuant to MINN. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2). When the
deposition of a nonparty is used in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment
motion and does not reflect first-hand knowledge or contains hearsay, it can be argued
that such testimony should be given weight when it supports a contention that there is no
evidence to support a given factual allegation. If a party against whom such a contention
is made does not proffer counterproof, his failure to do so coupled with such deposition
statements would be strong indicators that the factual allegation cannot be proved. The
use of such deposition testimony to establish the existence of a fact on motion for summary
judgment, however, may be more questionable. A heavy burden of proof may appropri-
ately be placed upon a party attempting to show the existence of a fact on a summary
judgment motion while it would be inappropriate to impose a heavy burden on one at-
tempting to establish the nonexistence of a fact. See text accompanying notes 40-43 izn/fra.
39. Dunnell Minnesota Digest suggests that the standard of proof on motion for sum-
mary judgment is substantially equivalent to that required for a directed verdict. See IOA
DUNNELL MINNESOTA DIGEST § 4988b, at 266-67 & nn.32-33 (3d ed. 1971 & 1980 Cum.
Supp.). None of the Minnesota cases cited by Dwmnell, however, directly support the prop-
osition that the standards are precisely equivalent. The text of this Article purposefully
states a more vague standard regarding the showing the moving party must make before
the opposing party is required to respond or have judgment rendered against him. One
contention of this Article is that, as a practical matter, a less stringent standard of proof
properly is imposed on the moving party in some summary judgment contexts. See Part
III infra. One commentator supports the proposition that the burden should be on the
party opposing the motion to show he could avoid a directed verdict against him at trial as
opposed to requiring the moving party to show he would be entitled to one. See Currie,
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summat, Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 72, 79 (1977); cf.
California Computer Prods. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 732-34
(9th Cir. 1979) (context in which motion is made has bearing on determining burden of
moving party).
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at least with respect to those issues deemed dispositive on the mo-
tion. Therefore courts should be particularly sensitive to which
party has the burden of proof on dispositive issues at trial. Judicial
sensitivity to the burden of proof can lead to justifiable distinctions
in the application of the summary judgment rule.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case discussed above, in
which facts B and C, both essential elements of plaintiff's claim,
and also fact D, the basis of defendant's affirmative defense, are in
dispute. If plaintiff is attempting to establish conclusively the
existence of facts B and C, or defendant is attempting to establish
conclusively the existence of fact D, corresponding to the burden
of proof each will have at trial, the application of a strict summary
judgment standard that imposes a heavy burden on a moving
party may be appropriate. For a directed verdict to be granted in
this context at trial, the supporting evidence would have to be so
strong that no fact-finder could reasonably find these facts not to
exist. ° Accordingly, on a motion for summary judgment in this
context, if differing inferences may be drawn from the supporting
evidence--even when completely unopposed by impeaching evi-
dence--or if the party opposing the motion submits any evidence
that casts doubt on the moving party's otherwise conclusive show-
ing or credibility, it is reasonable to give the party opposing the
motion every benefit of the doubt and allow the case to go to trial.
If the summary judgment motion is made when the moving
party will not have the ultimate burden of proof on the dispositive
issue, one commentator has argued cogently that a strict summary
judgment standard should not be used. 4' Returning to the hypo-
thetical case, assume the defendant is making the motion by assert-
ing the nonexistence of facts B or C, or plaintiff, after defendant
has admitted the existence of facts B and C, is asserting the nonex-
istence of fact D. In these situations, a relaxation of the burden of
proof required to sustain the motion is justified. Because it is more
difficult to prove conclusively the nonexistence of a fact than it is
40. See Lakehead Constructors, Inc. v. Roger Sheehy Co., 304 Minn. 175, 178, 229
N.W.2d 514, 515 (1975); Carlson v. Rand, 275 Minn. 272, 276, 146 N.W.2d 190, 193
(1966); Coleman v. Huebener, 269 Minn. 198, 203, 130 N.W.2d 322, 325 (1964); Webster
v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 515, 519, 64 N.W.2d 82, 85 (1954); Campion v. City of
Rochester, 202 Minn. 136, 139, 277 N.W. 422,423 (1938); Eichhorn v. Lundin, 172 Minn.
591, 594, 216 N.W. 537, 538 (1927).
41. See Louis, Federal SummaiyJudgzent Doct re: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745,
748-59 (1974).
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to prove its existence, 42 placing the burden of conclusively proving
the nonexistence of a fact on the moving party seems unreasonable
on its face. In addition, the party opposing the motion will have to
prove the existence of the challenged fact at trial. If the moving
party has presented any evidence, even if circumstantial, that the
party opposing the motion will not be able to prove the existence
of that fact at trial and the opposing party, having all discovery
devices available to him, fails to present any evidence from which
a fact-finder might reasonably find the challenged fact to exist,
there can be no justifiable reason for the litigation to continue.
The party opposing the motion has had the opportunity to obtain
the necessary evidence, and by not obtaining and presenting it, he
should be deemed to have admitted its nonexistence and have
judgment rendered against him.
43
The logical result of this analysis is that courts should be more
inclined toward imposing a less strict standard of proof when a
summary judgment motion is made by one seeking to negate the
existence of a fact essential to his opponent's case. The party op-
posing the motion, who will have the burden of establishing that
fact at trial, should be required to offer tangible evidence of his
ability to eventually sustain the burden of proof after the moving
party has submitted evidence suggesting the contrary. Generally
the party with the burden of proof will be more likely to have
knowledge of the location of witnesses, if any, who could supply
affidavits supporting the existence of necessary facts.44 Even if this
is not the case, the party opposing the motion would eventually be
required to use discovery to obtain this necessary evidence.
45 If
that party is either unwilling or unable to obtain the evidence at
the summary judgment stage, there is no point in allowing the liti-
gation to proceed through a needless trial to a directed verdict.
Fairness demands that trials of other litigants not be delayed by
42. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 337, at 788 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) ("If proof of the facts is inaccessible or not persuasive,
it is usually fairer to act as if the exceptional situation did not exist and therefore to place
the burden of proof and persuasion on the party claiming its existence.").
43. Cf. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). The court stated:
Although the district court may direct a verdict either against the party who
does not bear the burden of persuasion or the party who does bear that burden,
the amount of evidence required for a directed verdict differs. The party seeking a
directed verdict must make a stronger showing of evidence ifhe bears the burden ofpersuaion.
Id. at 733 n.2 (emphasis added).
44. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8, at 251-52 (2d ed. 1977).
45. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
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frivolous matters and that the moving party not be subjected to
the time and expense of litigating a nonmeritorious claim or de-
fense.
IV. THE PARADIGM CASES
To examine further the utility of the approach to summary
judgment in Part III, it will be helpful to discuss its application in
the context of four paradigm situations in which motions for sum-
mary judgment typically are made. These four paradigms are as
follows:
1. Motion by defendant seeking to negate an essential element
of the plaintiff's claim.
2. Motion by plaintiff seeking to negate the affirmative de-
fenses alleged by defendant when the basic allegations un-
derlying plaintiff's claim are admitted.
3. Motion by defendant seeking to establish conclusively the
existence of a valid affirmative defense.
4. Motion by plaintiff seeking to establish conclusively the
existence of a claim.
Not all cases dealing with summary judgment motions arise in
these precisely delineated contexts.46  A number of Minnesota
cases, however, do fit these categories. Combinations, of course,
exist. For example, a plaintiff bringing a motion of the type de-
scribed in paradigm four, seeking to establish conclusively the
existence of a claim, may also, as part of the motion, be required to
negate affirmative defenses that are raised by the defendant.
Therefore, a court deciding the motion would have to analyze the
case both in terms of paradigms two and four. This should not,
46. The paradigm cases generally would not encompass situations in which both par-
ties stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that only a question of law
is presented. The case of Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 241 N.W.2d 91
(1976), in which the parties stipulated the facts, however, may be an exception because it
may be properly analyzed as a paradigm three case. For a discussion of Rossman, see notes
5-8 supra and notes 73-77 inf:a and accompanying text. For a discussion of district court
judges' responses to questions regarding the extent of their review of the record when the
parties have stipulated the facts, see note 12 supra.
In addition, the analysis in Part III may not be applicable to cases that entail only an
issue of law. For example, in Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980), plaintiffs
brought suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting when they witnessed the
injury of their child in an automobile accident. Summary judgment for defendant was
affirmed on the grounds that plaintiffs were not within the "zone of danger." Id. at 555.
The affirmance was not based on plaintiffs' failure to rebut defendant's showing, but on
the court's ruling as a matter of law that persons not within the "zone of danger" may not
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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however, pose any extensive difficulties if the court clearly under-
stands the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties.
Applying the analysis described in Part III, if there is no rebut-
ting evidence, summary judgment appears to be more appropriate
in paradigms one and two. In these contexts, the moving party
normally seeks to negate the existence of a fact essential to the
other party's case, a fact for which the other party has the ultimate
burden of proof. That being the case, if the moving party presents
unrebutted circumstantial evidence indicating the other party's in-
ability to establish the challenged claim or defense at trial, sum-
mary judgment should be granted. If the opposing party does
present contrary evidence, however, summary judgment should be
denied if this contrary evidence would be sufficient to take the case
to the jury.
If the case falls within paradigms three and four, in which the
moving party is seeking to establish the conclusiveness of a fact for
which he has the eventual burden of proof at trial, courts may be
justified in looking more closely at the supporting documents, even
if they are uncontradicted. The possibility of granting the motion
in paradigm three and four cases, however, is not foreclosed.
V. THE MINNESOTA CASES
In the past few years a number of cases fitting the paradigm
situations noted in Part IV have been decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Although the court frequently has stated that the
moving party has the burden of demonstrating clearly the nonexis-
tence of a genuine issue of material fact, 47 analysis of these recent
Minnesota decisions indicates that the practical extent of that bur-
den and the focus and emphasis of the court differs depending on
which of the four paradigms the case seems to fit. 48 The court did
not analyze these cases along the lines suggested above. The re-
sults of the court's decisions, however, generally are consistent with
the results under the analysis suggested in this Article. In virtually
all recent paradigm one and two cases in which the party opposing
the motion failed to present substantial evidence to establish the
47. See, e.g., Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 439-
40, 194 N.W.2d 767, 774 (1971); Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 262-63, 143 N.W.2d 65,
68 (1966); Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 484-85, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1955).
48. In preparation for this Article the author reviewed all summary judgment deci-
sions by the Minnesota Supreme Court from 1971 to the present because these cases were
thought to reflect present views of the members of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
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existence of a fact challenged by the motion, summary judgment
was granted and affirmed. In contrast, decisions affirming sum-
mary judgment in the contexts of paradigms three and four have
been more difficult to obtain.
49
Sixteen cases that appear to fit within paradigm one 5o and two
49. See notes 50-84 ingfa and accompanying text.
One drawback in using only supreme court decisions for the analysis in this Article is
that the large number of lower court decisions granting or denying motions for summary
judgment is not represented. See note 19 supra. See generaly 3 D. MCFARLAND & W. KEP-
PEL, supra note 1, § 1659, at 251-52. The supreme court cases, however, reflect how these
motions should be handled by the lower courts.
50. See Town Bd. v. City Council, 298 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1980) (suit to restrain
Hastings City Council from publishing or filing proposed ordinance until hearing before
Minnesota Municipal Board; summary judgment for defendant affirmed because plaintiff
failed to file written objection to ordinance within time limitation necessary to invoke
jurisdiction of Minnesota Municipal Board); Ridgewood Dev. Co. v. State, 294 N.W.2d
288 (Minn. 1980) (suit to enjoin enforcement of statute; summary judgment for plaintiff
reversed on grounds that essential elements of claims had not been shown; reversal as
opposed to remand indicates summary judgment was entered for defendant on same
grounds); Johnson v. AID Ins. Co., 287 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1980) (declaratory judg-
ment action on insurer's duty to defend; summary judgment for defendant affirmed when
plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing damage suit against insured was within scope
of coverage); Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979) (negligence suit on theory
of joint enterprise; summary judgment for defendants affirmed in part when evidence in-
dicated lack of equal rights to direct and govern mutual undertaking and plaintiff failed
to submit any counterproof on the issue; summary judgment reversed, however, on issue of
individual negligence); Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979) (injunction
sought to restrain building of stadium; summary judgment affirmed when defendant sup-
plied court with "affidavits and documents on each factual question raised by the com-
plaint" and no counterproof was submitted); Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281
N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1979) (suit for specific performance of alleged contract; summary
judgment for defendant on finding of no contract reversed when supreme court found
valid offer and acceptance); City of Marshall v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 310
Minn. 489, 493-94, 246 N.W.2d 572, 575-76 (1976) (suit to enjoin certification that city
owed sums to retirement association pursuant to statute; summary judgment affirmed
when defendant's affidavits, taken to be true, entitled defendant to judgment as matter of
law and plaintiff failed to allege specific facts in response); Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn.
555, 558, 245 N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (1976) (per curiam) (vicarious liability suit against pur-
ported owner of automobile; summary judgment for defendants affirmed because owner-
ship of automobile was negated by affidavits and other supporting documents); Lidstrom
v. Mundahl, 310 Minn. 1, 4-5, 246 N.W.2d 16, 18 (1976) (declaratory judgment action to
determine rights in farm land; summary judgment for defendant affirmed when written
agreements between parties contained unambiguous and integrated expression of parties'
intentions and plaintiff could not introduce parol evidence); Beier v. Dresbach, 304 Minn.
545, 546, 229 N.W.2d 17, 17-18 (1975) (per curiam) (dramshop action; summary judg-
ment for defendant affirmed when affidavits and depositions did not support reasonable
inference that any of defendants illegally furnished intoxicating liquor); Rice v. Forby, 304
Minn. 23, 27-28, 228 N.W.2d 581, 584 (1975) (tort claim by business invitee; summary
judgment for defendants affirmed when stipulated facts gave no indication of preexisting
defective condition and plaintiff submitted no further evidence); Fleming Sheet Metal,
Inc. v. Leifco Realty Co., 300 Minn. 312, 313, 219 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1974) (per curiam)
1981]
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cases that appear to fit within paradigm two 5t have been rendered
by the Minnesota Supreme Court during the past decade. With
the exception of one 1971 negligence case, 52 in all those cases in
which the party opposing the motion apparently did not submit
any counterevidence, summary judgment was affirmed by the
court.53 After the moving party has made what might be called a
(action to recover money on agency theory; partial summary judgment for defendant af-
firmed when evidence before court gave no b-is for plaintiff's claim of agency rejation-
ship); Manpower, Inc. v. Best Temporaries, Inc., 293 Minn. 369, 370-71, 196 N.W.2d 288,
290 (1972) (per curiam) (action to enjoin former employee from breach of covenant not to
compete; summary judgment for plaintiff on counterclaims affirmed when depositions in-
dicated defendants had no tangible proof of allegations made in counterclaims); Forsblad
v. Jepson, 292 Minn. 458, 460, 195 N.W.2d 429, 430 (1972) (per curiam) (action based on
notice to defendant of alleged fraud of codefendant; summary judgment for defendant
affirmed when defendant denied knowledge of fraud and plaintiff set forth no facts ques-
tioning defendant's credibility); Dempsey v. Jaroscak, 290 Minn. 405, 408-10, 188 N.W.2d
779, 783 (1971) (personal injury suit; summary judgment for defendant reversed because
reasonable minds could differ whether deposition testimony of plaintiff and photographs
of accident scene showed breach of duty by defendants); Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v.
Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 439-40, 194 N.W.2d 767, 774 (1971) (negligence
action; summary judgment for defendant reversed when plaintiff gave offer of proof of
actual negligent conduct); cf. Davis v. Boise Cascade Corp., 288 N.W.2d 680, 683-84
(Minn. 1979) (suit for wrongful discharge from employment; summary judgment for de-
fendant affirmed when plaintiff showed no excuse for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies available under collective bargaining agreement). Davis can be characterized as
a paradigm one or paradigm three case because it can be argued that defendant estab-
lished a valid affirmative defense, a paradigm three case, or alternatively that plaintiff
failed to show an avoidance to this defense. Assuming this avoidance could be deemed an
"essential element" of plaintiff's case, this analysis would result in characterizing DarS as
a paradigm one case.
51. See Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980) (truck
driver brought tort claim against lessor and lessee of tractor truck in which he was injured;
lessee claimed truck driver was employee and therefore covered by Workers' Compensa-
tion Act; partial summary judgment for plaintiff affirmed, striking defendant's asserted
defenses); Vandeputte v. Soderholm, 298 Minn. 505, 509-10, 216 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1974)
(action on promissory note; summary judgment for plaintiff affirmed when defense of
fraud was offered but depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories of defendants gave no
evidence of fraud). In Newland, defendant's evidence of control over plaintiff was not
sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship that would make the Workers'
Compensation Act applicable, 295 N.W.2d at 618; defendant failed to show consent to the
alleged special employment relationship which, if shown, might establish an affirmative
defense under the loaned servant doctrine, id.; and defendant failed to establish the de-
fense of election of remedies, id. at 619-20.
52. Dempsey v. Jaroscak, 290 Minn. 405, 188 N.W.2d 779 (1971).
53. See Town Bd. v. City Council, 298 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1980); Johnson v.
AID Ins. Co., 287 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1980); Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97
(Minn. 1979); City of Marshall v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 310 Minn. 489,
493-94, 246 N.W.2d 572, 575-76 (1976); Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 558, 245 N.W.2d
258, 260-61 (1976) (per curiam); Lindstrom v. Mundahl, 310 Minn. 1, 4-5, 246 N.W.2d 16,
18 (1976); Beier v. Dresbach, 304 Minn. 545, 546, 229 N.W.2d 17, 17-18 (1975) (per
curiam); Rice v. Forby, 304 Minn. 23, 27-28, 228 N.W.2d 581, 584 (1975); Fleming Sheet
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prima facie showing of the other party's probable inability to
prove an essential element of the case, the focus of the court has
not been on the strength of the moving party's evidence, but rather
on the lack of supporting evidence proffered by the party opposing
the motion.54 In several of these cases, the court reviewed the doc-
uments submitted on the motion and concluded that the evidence
failed to meet the standard of proof required for the party oppos-
ing the motion to prevail at trial.55 The claim of the opposing
party that the needed evidence may be obtained at a later date
following discovery has fallen on deaf ears, making it clear that the
time to obtain evidence is before a ruling on the motion. 56 Even
when the basis of the motion is a simple unqualified sworn state-
ment by the defendant, summary judgment has been affirmed in
the absence of evidence tending to show a reasonable basis for
questioning defendant's credibility.
57
In Dempse v. Jaroscak,5 the one case that appears to be inconsis-
tent with this pattern, the court noted that summary judgment is
Metal, Inc. v. Leifco Realty Co., 300 Minn. 312, 219 N.W.2d 620 (1974) (per curiam);
Vandeputte v. Soderholm, 298 Minn. 505, 509-10, 216 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1974); Man-
power, Inc. v. Best Temporaries, Inc., 293 Minn. 369, 370-71, 196 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1972)
(per curiam); Forsblad v. Jepson, 292 Minn. 458, 460, 194 N.W.2d 429, 430 (1972) (per
curiam).
In three of the paradigm one cases, see note 50 supra, the parties opposing the motion
appear to have produced or referred to evidence in opposition to the motion that the
supreme court felt was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Delgado v.
Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979); Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281
N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1979); Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 201
Minn. 429, 439-40, 194 N.W.2d 767, 774 (1971). Notwithstanding that summary judg-
ment was reversed, at least in part, in these cases, the focus of the court was similar to that
taken in paradigm one and two cases in which the judgment was affirmed.
54. See notes 55-57, 62-63 infta and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Minn.
1980) (paradigm two case); Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 558, 245 N.W.2d 258, 261
(1976) (per curiam) (paradigm one case); Beier v. Dresbach, 304 Minn. 545, 546, 229
N.W.2d 17, 18 (1975) (per curiam) (paradigm one case); Vandeputte v. Soderholm, 298
Minn. 505, 509-10, 216 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1974) (paradigm two case); Manpower, Inc. v.
Best Temporaries, Inc., 293 Minn. 369, 370-71, 195 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1972) (per curiam)
(paradigm one case).
56. See Manpower, Inc. v. Best Temporaries, Inc., 293 Minn. 369, 371, 195 N.W.2d
288, 290 (1972) (per curiam). The requirement that proof be obtained prior to a ruling on
the motion is consistent with federal practice. See, e.g., DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int'l,
Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1139-40 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1980) (affidavits submitted after summary
judgment hearing need not be considered); Farina v. Mission Inv. Trust, 615 F.2d 1068,
1076 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
57. See Forsblad v. Jepson, 292 Minn. 458, 460, 195 N.W.2d 429, 430 (1972) (per
curiam).
58. 290 Minn. 405, 188 N.W.2d 779 (1971).
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difficult to obtain in negligence cases,59 and, in what may be a
strained factual analysis, held that the facts proffered by the mov-
ing party could support differing conclusions on the negligence is-
sue.6° Dempsey is the only paradigm one or two case in which
summary judgment was reversed in the absence of production of
fairly significant counterevidence by the party opposing the mo-
tion. Because it was a negligence case, Dempsqy may be somewhat
sui generis.
6 1
In general, however, it is the context of paradigm one or two
cases in which the court has emphasized strongly the language in
Rule 56 requiring the party opposing the motion to set forth "spe-
cific facts" to justify his opposition.62 When the opposing party
has failed to do so, summary judgment routinely has been af-
firmed. 63 The focus of the court in these cases has been not on the
strength of the moving party's evidence, but rather on the absence
of substantial counterevidence by the party opposing the motion.
Therefore, it appears that the clearest cases for the propriety of
summary judgment exist in the context of paradigms one and two.
This is true at least when the moving party has reason to believe,
as a result of discovery or otherwise, that the opposing party will
not be able to produce convincing evidence in opposition to the
motion.
In cases involving paradigms three and four,64 in which the
moving party will have the burden of proof on the dispositive issue
or issues at trial, the picture is not nearly so clear. In these con-
texts, apparently conflicting cases abound, and the moving party's
heavy burden is emphasized. For example, four cases decided in
the previous decade involved summary judgment motions based
59. See id. at 407, 188 N.W.2d at 781.
60. See id. at 408, 188 N.W.2d at 783.
61. See 2 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 574 (1970). The au-
thors state that "[i]ssues of negligence and proximate cause are seldom matters capable of
determination of a Rule 56 summary judgment motion. The legal standards of reasona-
bleness and causation are uniquely jury functions." Id. But see Beier v. Dresbach, 304
Minn. 545, 546, 229 N.W.2d 17, 17-18 (1975) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment
for defendants in dramshop case); Rice v. Forby, 304 Minn. 23, 27-28, 228 N.W.2d 581,
584 (1975) (summary judgment for defendants sustained in negligence suit).
62. See, e.g., Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979) (paradigm one
case); City of Marshall v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 310 Minn. 489, 494, 246
N.W.2d 572, 575 (1976) (paradigm one case); Rice v. Forby, 304 Minn. 23, 27-28, 228
N.W.2d 581, 584 (1975) (paradigm one case); Vandeputte v. Soderholm, 298 Minn. 505,
509, 216 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1974) (paradigm two case).
63. See note 62 supra.
64. See notes 65-84 infa and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/10
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MINNESOTA
on the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata,
paradigm three situations.65 These cases illustrate the moving
party's heavy burden. In two of these cases in which summary
judgment was affirmed, the court set forth in some detail the his-
tory and rationale of the prior judgments. 66 In the two cases in
which summary judgment was reversed it is arguable that the fo-
cus of the court was on the failure of the moving party to negate
potential counterarguments to the res judicata defense. 67 In Hauser
v. Mealyv68 the court noted that in the previous action the orders
denying plaintiff's requested relief were unaccompanied by memo-
randa setting forth the grounds for the order.69 As a result, it was
unclear what issues could be given collateral estoppel effect and,
therefore, plaintiff was given the opportunity to relitigate the mat-
ter.70 In Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Club 167,
Inc. ,71 the court was unable to ascertain from the record whether
the claim in the second action was identical to that raised in the
first, placing on the defendant the burden of clearly establishing
that the claims were identical. The implication of these cases is
that a party moving for summary judgment on the ground of res
judicata must offer detailed proof that the defense is valid, regard-
less of the lack of any counterproof or counterarguments raised by
65. See notes 66-72 infa and accompanying text.
66. See Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 477-80, 246 N.W.2d
687, 691-92 (1976) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed because plaintiff was col-
laterally estopped by prior verdict); Kelly v. Kelly, 304 Minn. 237, 241-42, 229 N.W.2d
526, 529 (1975) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed because maintenance of ac-
tion would constitute collateral attack upon lower court order).
67. See Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 1978) (summary judgment for
defendant reversed because lower court decision did not have resjudicata effect and reliti-
gation of issues was not precluded by doctrine of collateral estoppel); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Club 167, Inc., 295 Minn. 573, 574-75, 204 N.W.2d 820,
821 (1973) (per curiam) (summary judgment for defendant reversed on ground ofresjudi-
cata).
68. 263 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1978) (action for reformation of deeds, breach of con-
tract, and fraud).
69. Id. at 809.
70. Id. The Hauser court relied on the following statement:
[IfQ the judgment might have been based upon one or more of several grounds,
but does not expressly rely upon any one of them, then none of them is conclu-
sively established under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, since it is impossible
for another court to tell which issue or issues were adjudged by the rendering
court.
Id. at 808 (quoting IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[l], at 3915 (2d ed. 1974)).
71. 295 Minn. 573, 204 N.W.2d 820 (1973) (per curiam) (equity action to restrain
defendants from disposing of or spending certain funds and obtain judgment declaring
plaintiffs as owners of the funds).
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the party opposing the motion. 72
Cases dealing with other affirmative defenses seem to breed con-
fusion. Two recent cases have involved summary judgment mo-
tions based on exculpatory or liability-limiting contractual
provisions. In Rossman v. 70 River Drive 73 which was discussed ear-
lier, the court held that before determining the validity of a lease
provision that exculpates the landlord for negligent acts, the facts
giving rise to the injury would have to be shown more specifi-
caiiy. 74 The court appeared to place on the moving party the obli-
gation to negate the existence of any facts that could support a
holding that the exculpatory clause was unenforceable as a matter
of public policy under the circumstances of the case. 75 In Morgan
Co. v. Minnesota Miing & Manufacturing Co. ,76 however, the court
indicated that the facts in the record had "not persuaded" the
court that the liability-limiting provision was unconscionable or
against public policy. The language in Morgan indicates that the
nonmoving party may have the burden to come forth with facts jus-
tifying a finding of legal nonenforceability. In this sense, the Mor-
gan and Rossman decisions appear inconsistent. At the least,
however, Rossman indicates that a party moving for summary judg-
ment based on exculpatory or liability-limiting contractual provi-
sions should be thorough in preparing supporting documentation
to negate any anticipated factual circumstances that may avoid
the validity of the defense, even though the opposing party may
fail to make the anticipated challenge.
77
Even when a release is the affirmative defense, the court empha-
72. See Brown v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 293 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. 1980).
Brown is a paradigm four case. Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action on in-
surer's duty to defend and indemnify plaintiff for damages awarded in a prior suit. Id. at
824. The insurer argued that plaintiff's actions creating liability were intentional and
therefore excluded from coverage. Id. On appeal, summary judgment for plaintiff on the
duty to indemnify was reversed because the issue of intent to injure, on which plaintiff's
summary judgment motion in the present case was based, was not necessary to the result
in the previous case. Id. at 825. Summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of insurer's
duty to defend was affirmed, however, on the theory that "[i]f any part of the claim is
arguably within the scope of coverage afforded by the policy, the insurer should defend
and reserve its right to contest coverage based on facts developed at trial." Id. at 825-26.
73. 308 Minn. 134, 241 N.W.2d 91 (1976); see notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
74. See 308 Minn. at 137-38, 241 N.W.2d at 93.
75. See id.
76. 310 Minn. 305, 246 N.W.2d 443 (1976).
77. Professor Louis argues that requiring the movant to establish the nonexistence of
a potential avoidance of affirmative defenses, which arguably is required by Rossman and
the cases dealing with release defenses, see notes 78-82 inta and accompanying text, places
an undue burden on the movant and would require the party opposing the motion to
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sizes the moving party's extensive burden. In Schmidt v. Smith ,78
the court noted that summary judgment may be appropriate when
the supporting evidence shows execution of the release under cir-
cumstances evincing basic fairness, and both parties clearly indi-
cate in the instrument an intent to release all claims for known and
unknown injuries.79 The Schmidt court appeared to place the bur-
den of proving the release and "fair surrounding circumstances"
on the moving defendant. In a later decision, Barilla v. Clap-
shaw,80 the defendant submitted an extensive affidavit showing the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. The Ba-
ri//a court, however, unlike the Schmidt court, noted specifically
that the nonmoving plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a genuine
issue of fact precluding enforcement of the release, for example,
lack of "fair surrounding circumstances."''" The Schmidt and Ba-
rilla decisions do not resolve how much proof is required of the
defendant before the plaintiff must respond or lose the motion.
Notwithstanding the resulting confusion regarding the extent of
the defendant's required showing, its seems clear that something
more than a prima facie proof of a defense-the release itself-is
required for the moving party to be successful under these circum-
stances, even in the absence of any responsive showing by plain-
tiff.8
2
Many other Minnesota cases emphasize the heavy burden of
proof imposed on the moving party in the context of paradigms
three and four.83 In the few paradigm three and four cases in
respond with proof establishing at least the prima facie existence of an avoidance. Louis,
supra note 41, at 747 n.l1.
78. 299 Minn. 103, 216 N.W.2d 669 (1974).
79. See id. at 109, 215 N.W.2d at 673-74.
80. 306 Minn. 437, 237 N.W.2d 830 (1976).
81. Id. at 440-41, 237 N.W.2d at 831-32.
82. Two other recent cases dealing with the affirmative defense of release are consis-
tent with the notion that a defendant's burden in summary judgment motions based on a
release is substantial. See Eddy v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 290 N.W.2d 174, 177
(Minn. 1980) (summary judgment for defendant, on ground that he was agent of code-
fendant who had settled plaintiff's claim, reversed because defendant's status as agent had
not been established); Anders v. Dakota Land & Dev. Co., 289 N.W.2d 161, 163-64 (Minn.
1980) (summary judgment for defendant reversed on ground that although principal of
defendants had been released from liability, record did not establish as a matter of law
that individual defendants could not be found independently liable as well).
83. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 282 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Minn. 1979) (employ-
ment discrimination suit; motion based on statute allowing affirmative defense of serious
threat to health and safety of disabled worker; summary judgment for defendant reversed
when supporting evidence disclosed past disability but not substantial evidence establish-
ing that workplace constituted present threat to plaintiff's health); Harrington v. County
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which summary judgment was affirmed, extensive documentation
usually was submitted in support of the motion and typically no
counterevidence was submitted.84 This is in sharp contrast to cases
of Ramsey, 279 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1979) (medical malpractice claim; summary judg-
ment based on statute of limitations reversed when evidence of continuing pattern of seri-
ous mental illness was sufficient to create fact issue regarding plaintiff's insanity; statute of
limitations tolled); All Am. Foods, Inc. v. County of Aitkin, 266 N.W.2d 704, 705-06
(Minn. 1978) (per curiam) (suit for interference with plaintiff's land; summary judgment
for defendants revemed on bis that title to propcrty was nut eshcntial when plaintiff was
in continued possession of property) (case arguably falls within paradigm one because
defendants argued that plaintiff was not a proper party in interest); Corwine v. Crow
Wing County, 309 Minn. 345, 361-62, 244 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1976) (action to compel
issuance of special permitted use permit and planned unit development permit for camp-
ground; summary judgment for plaintiff reversed when record raised facts from which
county board could find a legally sufficient reason for revocation of the previously issued
permit); Cobb v. City of Willmar, 308 Minn. 462, 463-64, 242 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1976) (per
curiam) (action against city for demolition of house and garage; summary judgment for
defendant city reversed when question existed whether plaintiff was occupant of property)
(case arguably falls within paradigm one because defendant argued plaintiff could not
show entitlement to property); Federal Ins. Co. v. Pratt's Express, 308 Minn. 282, 284, 241
N.W.2d 488, 489 (1976) (per curiam) (subrogation action by insured; summary judgment
for defendant reversed when affirmative defense was based on affidavit merely expressing
conclusion); Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 400-01, 220 N.W.2d 498, 502-03 (1974) (de-
claratory judgment action seeking determination that sand, gravel, and limestone were
not subject to mineral rights reservation; summary judgment for plaintiffs reversed when
language of mineral rights reservation was ambiguous leaving genuine fact issues for the
court); Roaderick v. Lull Eng'r Co., 296 Minn. 385, 389-90, 208 N.W.2d 761, 764 (1973)
(action against employer for commission or bonus payments; summary judgment for de-
fendant reversed when defense of accord and satisfaction was raised and depositions in
support of motion did not show clearly that payments made were intended to be full
payment of plaintiff's claims); Morgan v. Tara Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 293 Minn. 423, 424-25,
196 N.W.2d 630, 632 (1972) (per curiam) (action on fire insurance policy; summary judg-
ment for plaintiff reversed when numerous issues of material fact not clearly negated by
materials submitted in support of motion).
84. See, e.g., Worwa v. Solz Enterprises, Inc., 307 Minn. 490, 238 N.W.2d 628 (1976)
(per curiam) (suit for money allegedly due under oral contract; summary judgment for
defendant affirmed when affirmative defenses based on statute of frauds and statute of
limitations were held sufficient in light of plaintiff's deposition testimony); St. Cloud Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Sobania Constr. Co., 302 Minn. 71, 74-76, 224 N.W.2d 746, 748-49
(1974) (per curiam) (action to recover money advanced against a check; affirmed sum-
mary judgment for plaintiff who submitted documents in support of motion showing that
check was obtained in usual course of business and defendant, aside from making claims of
negligence, pointed to nothing indicating any lack of honesty or good faith by plaintiff)
(case arguably falls within paradigm two); County of Hennepin v. Mikulay, 292 Minn.
200, 203-05, 194 N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (1972) (condemnation proceedings; summary judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed where numerous documents were submitted by plaintiff in sup-
port of motion and no counter-affidavits were submitted by defendant; court emphasized
rules precluding opposing party from relying on pleadings or possible cross-examination at
a later date).
An exception to this pattern involves cases in which an unambiguous contractual
provision is the basis for the claim or defense and is asserted to be controlling as a matter
of law on the summary judgment motion. In these cases, the party opposing the motion
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involving paradigms one and two, in which the supporting docu-
mentation was comparatively scant and language emphasizing the
moving party's heavy burden is noticeably absent. In practice, if
not as a matter of stated policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court's
handling of summary judgment cases differs in focus and approach
depending on the context in which the motions are made. When
the moving party contends that the opposing party will be unable
to prove a fact that the opponent must prove to succeed at trial,
the court generally focuses on the opposing party's burden of re-
plying to this contention. Little attention is given to the moving
party's burden of proof on the motion. It seems fair to conclude
that in the context of paradigms one and two, the court has ap-
plied a less stringent standard regarding proof that the moving
party must present to adequately support the motion than in the
context of paradigms three and four, in which the moving party
will have the burden of proof on the dispositive issue or issues at
trial. In paradigm one and two cases, the burden on the moving
party appears to be one of suggesting the probability that the
party opposing the motion will not be able to establish a necessary
fact for which the opposing party will ultimately have the burden
of proof. Once this is done, the party opposing the motion must
respond with sufficient counterproof or risk having judgment ren-
dered against him. In paradigm three and four cases the burden of
the moving party to establish clearly the nonexistence of genuine
issues of material fact appears to have remained relatively intact.
may point to extensive evidence supporting his claim that the provision is not controlling,
but the court has affirmed summary judgment in this context on several occasions
notwithstanding arguments asserting that this extrinsic evidence should be considered.
See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lorraine Realty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 349 (Minn.
1979) (mortgage foreclosure action; summary judgment for mortgagee affirmed because
contract was unambiguous and had been relied on for over a decade); In re Turners Cross-
road Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1979) (action to delete certain restrictions from
summary judgment for certificate of title; affirmed when all relevant evidence was before
court and was undisputed); Davis v. Boise Cascade Corp., 288 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn.
1979) (summary judgment affirmed for defendant on ground that plaintiff failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies required by collective bargaining agreement and presented
no rebuttal evidence on validity of contractual requirement). But see American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees Local 66 v. St. Louis County Bd., 281 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 1979) (action against county for unfair labor practice; summary judgment for de-
fendant reversed on ground that dispute, to be resolved under contractual grievance pro-
cedure, was not within contractual or statutory definition of "grievance" and plaintiffs
were thus not precluded from seeking a judicial remedy).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Approaching summary judgment by application of the para-
digm analysis outlined in this Article can be useful to both attor-
neys and courts. This analysis will provide the litigator with a
means to determine whether there is sufficient likelihood of success
to warrant the motion. If the motion is made, reference to the
patterns of summary judgment decisions by the Minnesota
Supreme Court may persuade the trial court, particularly in Dara-
digm one and two cases, that the motion has merit and is likely to
be affirmed on appeal. If the case falls within paradigms three or
four, however, the attorney is forewarned of the relatively more
difficult task of persuading the court that summary judgment is
appropriate.
This analysis also will focus the court's attention on who will
have the burden of proof on material issues at trial. If the party
opposing the motion has not produced evidence showing a realistic
chance of prevailing at trial, further expenditure of time, money,
and judicial resources is unjustified. Assuming the Minnesota
Supreme Court remains consistent in its approach, the lower court
may grant summary judgment motions consonant with this analy-
sis in greater confidence that the decision will be affirmed on ap-
peal.
In proper application, use of the analysis of this Article should
lead attorneys to make summary judgment motions in more ap-
propriate contexts and thereby reduce unnecessary and expensive
litigation at both the lower and appellate judicial levels.
[Vol. 7
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APPENDIX: MINNESOTA SUMMARY JUDGMENT
QUESTIONNAIRE
In August 1980 questionnaires on summary judgment were sent to fifty
Minnesota district court judges and fifty Minnesota attorneys, all of
whom were listed in the 1978-1979 Directory of the Section of Litigation
of the American Bar Association.8 5 Thirty-two judges and twenty-six at-
torneys responded.86 This Appendix will summarize those responses in
greater detail than was attempted in the text of this Article.
8 7
JUDGE'S FORM
Total Responses: 32 (22 "outstate"; 10 "metro")88
J-1. To the extent generalizations can be made, what are your views
on the utility of summary judgment in Minnesota?
A. It is a very useful time-saving tool to weed out frivolous
cases: 17.
B. It has some utility in streamlining the litigation process, but
not to the extent that I would deem it "very useful": 12.
C. It is generally useless: 2 (both outstate).
D. Other opinions or additional comments:
"It is a very useful time-saving tool to present questions
of law and to eliminate some issues."
"Abused by some lawyers who make the motion
automatically."
"Not frequently, however, but useful in cases where it
fits." [Qualifying an affirmative response to "A."]
"And where there are no issues of fact-only issues of
law." [Qualifying an affirmative response to "A."]
85. Se [1978-1979] ABA THE SECTION OF LITIGATION DIRECTORY 138-44 (1978).
86. All questionnaires returned and a list of the attorneys and district court judges
responding are on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office. To assure anonymity in
response to this questionnaire, the identity of each respondent was removed from the ques-
tionnaire prior to tabulation.
Some of the attorneys and judges surveyed did not respond to every question. Ac-
cordingly, the total number of responses to each question may not always equal the
number of questionnaires returned.
87. For a selective discussion of responses to the summary judgment questionnaire,
see notes 9-21 srupra and accompanying text. Respondents' comments quoted in this Ap-
pendix have been edited for grammatical consistency.
88. When the views of "outstate" and "metro" respondents differ significantly in re-
sponse to a question, that difference will be noted parenthetically following the question.
"Metro" respondents are those from Hennepin and Ramsey Counties. "Outstate" respon-
dents are those residing in counties other than Hennepin and Ramsey.
25
Pielemeier: Summary Judgment in Minnesota: A Search for Patterns
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
"Is" is deleted and "could be" is inserted. [Qualifying
an affirmative response to "A."]
J-2. In general, how would you characterize the propriety of the use of
the summary judgment rule by attorneys who appear before you?
A. It is markedly overused and misused. Agree: 9 (50% of
responding metro judges; 33% of responding outstate
judges). Disagree: 19.
B. It is more often than not improperly claimed to justify relief.
Agree: 20 (100% of responding metro judges; 62% nf re-
sponding outstate judges). Disagree: 8.
C. It is usually asserted as a basis for relief only in appropriate
cases. Agree: 9 (17% of responding metro judges; 40% of
responding outstate judges). Disagree: 17.
D. It is frequently not invoked in cases where it should be
invoked. Agree: 5. Disagree: 20.
E. Other general comments:
"It is a mixed bag. Probably in a majority of cases it is
properly asserted with a significant minority inappropri-
ately asserted."
"It is almost automatically used, whether appropriate or
not."
J-3. What do you believe are the motives for which attorneys nor-
mally make motions for summary judgment?
A. To decrease the expense of litigation and avoid a needless
trial (or to limit the issues in cases of partial summary judg-
ment). Most of the time such motions are made: 12 (13% of
responding metro judges; 50% of responding outstate
judges). At least 50% of the time: 11 (38% of responding
metro judges; 36% of responding outstate judges). Rarely: 7
(50% of responding metro judges; 14% of responding outstate
judges). Never: 0.
B. To increase the ultimate expense of the litigation to their
client and thereby primarily benefit themselves financially.
Most of the time such motions are made: 1 (outstate). At
least 50% of the time: 6 (50% of responding metro judges;
10% of responding outstate judges). Rarely: 21 (50% of re-
sponding metro judges; 81% of responding outstate judges).
Never: 1.
C. To increase the expense of the litigation to their opponents.
Most of the time such motions are made: 0. At least 50% of
the time: 5 (38% of responding metro judges; 10% of re-
sponding outstate judges). Rarely: 22 (63% of responding
metro judges; 81% of responding outstate judges). Never: 2
(both outstate).
D. To obtain information from their opponent which may be
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difficult to obtain under other procedural rules. Most of the
time such motions are made: 1 (outstate). At least 50% of
the time: 4 (33% of responding metro judges; 5% of respond-
ing outstate judges). Rarely: 20 (44% of responding metro
judges; 76% of responding outstate judges). Never: 5.
E. To avoid potential malpractice claims. Most of the time
such motions are made: 0. At least 50% of the time: 6 (38%
of responding metro judges; 14% of responding outstate
judges). Rarely: 18 (50% of responding metro judges; 67%
of responding outstate judges). Never: 5.
F. To show their clients that they are "doing something." Most
of the time such motions are made: 1 (metro). At least 50%
of the time: 10 (44% of responding metro judges; 29% of re-
sponding outstate judges). Rarely: 14 (33% of responding
metro judges; 52% of responding outstate judges). Never: 5.
G. Other motives:
"Probably to lay the groundwork with the trial judge for
favorable rulings at trial and perhaps post trial."
"To test legal theories-to become to some extent
educated on potentialities of a claim or defense."
"To increase the potential for settlement."
"To slow down the setting of a trial date."
"Pushing for case to settle and avoid trial and
disposition."
"To resolve pretrial issues which cannot be mutually
resolved."
H. Please state whether any of the motives listed above are in
your view more likely to be motives of attorneys represent-
ing plaintiffs or defendants. [Responses omitted because of
ambiguity in question.]
J-4. When attorneys for both sides of the litigation stipulate that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the only question is
one of law, which of the following statements, if any, would gener-
all describe your initial view prior to more in-depth review of the
case?
A. That summary judgment is probably appropriate for
someone. Agree: 26. Disagree: 3.
B. That notwithstanding these stipulations, summary judgment
is just as likely to be inappropriate as appropriate. Agree: 4.
Disagree: 21.
C. I intend to affirmatively examine the attorneys and the
record in greater detail in order to determine whether they
have overlooked any possible material fact issues. Agree:
13. Disagree: 12.
D. I generally accept these stipulations as true and do not
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affirmatively look for potential factual issues the attorneys
have not raised. Agree: 14 (67% of responding metro
judges; 42% of responding outstate judges). Disagree: 14.
E. Other comments:
"I find it a rare but useful device to obtain a ruling from
the court."
"I do lean towards the agreed upon position of the
attorneys as a general rule."
"Many times fact questions arise because of the state of
the law and further proof may be necessary."
J-5. How would you categorize the attitude of other district judges
you know regarding summary judgment? Please attempt to
estimate a percentage for each category.
METRO OUTSTATE TOTAL
Generally favorable
to summary judgment.
0% ................... 2 1 3
1-25% ................ 4 4 8
26-50% ............... 0 2 2
51-75% ............... 0 3 3
76-100% .............. 0 2 2
Check marks 0 2 2
Generally unfavorable
to summary judgment.
0% ................... 0 4 4
1-25% ................ 0 2 2
26-50% ............... 2 3 5
51-75% ............... 2 3 5
76-100% .............. 3 1 4
Check marks 0 4 4
Neutral.
0% ................... 2 3 5
1-25% ................ 3 6 9
26-50% . ............... 1 2 3
51-75% ............... 0 0 0
76-100% .............. 0 1 1
Check marks 0 0 0
[Of the responding metro judges, none considered more than 25%
of other judges to be "generally favorable" to summary judgment
and none considered less than 25% of other judges to be "gener-
ally unfavorable" to summary judgment. The responses of the
outstate judges were evenly divided between favorable, unfavora-
ble, and neutral categories.]
J-6. If you consider yourself generally unfavorable to summary judg-
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ment, which, if any, of the following reasons do you believe have
led to that viewpoint?
A. A desire to decide the case based on live testimony: 5.
B. A high regard for jury determination of cases: 8.
C. Attorneys often make such motions in inappropriate
contexts: 7.
D. A desire to give the parties the feeling that their case will be
fully heard: 5.
E. Fear of reversal: 1.
F. Other reasons:
"Usually are fact questions for the jury."
"A feeling that it's quite unusual for a disagreement to
'get to court' without some disagreement as to the basic
facts."
"High regard" is deleted and "preference" is inserted.
[Qualifying an affirmative response to "B."]
"A fuller examination of more facts and seeing the
witnesses, and the ability to question when certain facts
are unclear."
J-7. In general, how would you characterize decisions of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court on summary judgment?
A. It reverses summary judgment more often than is warranted:
5.
B. It affirms summary judgment more often than is warranted:
0.
C. About right: 22.
D. Other:
"Years ago 'A' occurred. With Justice Sheran's ascent
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, summary judgment is
more sympathetically received."
"Should clearly show that they support summary
judgments."
"NA except for appeals from my summary judgment
orders."
J-8. Of the other district judges you know who take a "conservative"
approach to summary judgment and are generally inclined to
deny such motions (ie., those judges included in the "unfavora-
ble" category under question 5), what reasons do you think un-
derlie such decisions?
A. Fear of reversal. Most: 3. Over 50%: 4. Few: 12. None: 1.
B. A desire to decide the case based on live testimony. Most: 3.
Over 50%: 7. Few: 8. None: 1.
C. High regard for jury determinations. Most: 2. Over 50%:
9. Few: 5. None: 1.
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D. A desire to give the parties the feeling that their case will be
fully heard. Most: 5. Over 50%: 5. Few: 10. None: 0.
E. Attorneys often make such motions in inappropriate cases.
Most: 5. Over 50%: 8. Few: 7. None: 0.
F. Other:
"Impossible to determine; however, I do not believe 'fear
of reversal' is a likely motivation."
"Unwillingness to do the work and write a decision."
"So far as I know. iudge_ are. neutral anrl lIok ffr th
right solution."
J-9. How often do you read the supporting and opposing memoranda
of the parties before deciding a summary judgment motion?
Always: 30. Usually: 2. Infrequently: 0. Never or
Almost Never: 0.
J-10. Approximately what percentage of summary judgment motions
which have been made before you would you estimate you have
granted?
0-10%: 10 (32%)
11-25%: 8 (26%)
26-50%: 7 (23%)
51-75%: 6 (19%)
J- 11. Do you believe attorneys in general have a sufficient understand-
ing of the summary judgment rule so as to invoke it only in ap-
propriate cases and to make pertinent (nonfrivolous) arguments
regarding such motions?
A. The vast majority do: 10 (31%).
B. Over 50% do: 12 (38%).
C. Less than 50% do: 8 (25%).
D. Very few do: 2 (6%) (both metro).
J-12. It has been asserted that many district judges have a tendency to
deny summary judgment motions virtually as a matter of course.
Based on your experience, do you think this assertion is accurate?
Yes: 11 (4 metro; 7 outstate). No: 20 (5 metro; 15
outstate).
J-13. Other general comments:
"I would hope summary judgment motions could be
properly used to expedite the disposition of mounting case
loads."
"On many occasions I will defer the motion for
summary judgment on one or more issues until trial be-
cause the case has to be tried anyway and I will have all
the evidence before me when I rule. I take more time and
go into it more thoroughly when the motion, if granted,
will be dispositive of the entire case."
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"In earlier years, say ten to fifteen years ago, some
defense attorneys in auto negligence cases abused sum-
mary judgment motions. This occurs today much less fre-
quently. Also law schools teach research better than in
earlier years, consequently the younger crop of attorneys
present summary judgment motions much better and
more appropriately."
"Summary judgment is helpful in disposing of cases, but
often is used as a delaying tactic and for discovery by at-
torneys. It has its place in the legal process, however, and I
am not opposed to its use."
"Most lawyers do not recognize that summary judgment
should rarely be granted--especially in tort cases. Never-
theless, the great bulk of such motions coming before me
are in tort cases."
"Summary judgment is most frequently granted by
myself and by other judges in the district where there are
disputed issues of fact, but the facts are not 'material.'
There is a significant number of cases in which plaintiffs
assert a right to recovery merely because they have been
damaged in some way, yet there is no legitimate legal basis
for recovery. In these cases (of which there appears to be a
growing number), summary judgment is used as the
equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. Even when motions
for dismissal would have a fair chance of success, it appears
that defense attorneys would rather by-pass that proce-
dure, conduct some discovery, and then bring a motion for
summary judgment. On the other hand, where there is a
clearly cognizable legal claim or defense, I am reluctant to
grant summary judgment. I believe that the practice in
this district is to grant summary judgment motions very
sparingly, both because of the spirit of Rule 56 and be-
cause of the supreme court's insistence on resolving all
doubts against the motion. In general, I am aware of very
little abuse of the summary judgment procedure, and I
find the views underlying the questionnaire unnecessarily
cynical."
"Summary judgments are granted only on such occasion
where there is no fact issue to be determined and therefore
it is granted sparingly as there is usually some fact issue for
determination. However, motions for summary judgment
do smoke out what the fact issues are as between the par-
ties even though most motions for summary judgment are
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denied. These motions are still a useful tool to dispose of
cases in which there is no fact issue to be determined."
"Very useful---quite often precipitates agreement on
facts, making trial unnecessary. Even a partial summary
judgment will save trial time."
"The supreme court has an obvious policy of favoring
trials and most summary judgment orders appealed from
are reversed."
"Summary Judgment is very valuable, however, lawyers
use it in inappropriate cases, claiming no fact dispute
when there actually is. Of course, in opposition, lawyers
claim fact disputes when there aren't any. The judge has
to make that determination. Some judges are timid and
seldom grant these motions. I use them whenever possible
to cut down further litigation."
ATTORNEY'S FORM
Total Responses: 26 (8 "outstate"; 18 "metro")89
A-0. How long have you been in practice?
1-2years: 0. 2-5years: 3. 5-10years: 7. 10 or more years:
16.
A-00. Do you primarily represent plaintiffs or defendants in civil litiga-
tion?9O
Plaintiffs: 4. Defendants: 9. A fairly even balance
between plaintiffs and defendants: 13.
A- 1. To the extent generalizations can be made, what are your views
on the utility of summary judgment in Minnesota?
A. It is a very useful time-saving tool to weed out frivolous
cases: 3.
B. It has some utility in streamlining the litigation process, but
not to the extent that I would deem it "very useful": 13.
C. It is generally useless: 7 (5 of those responding primarily
represent defendants while 2 represent a balance of plaintiffs
and defendants).
D. Other opinions or additional comments:
"As a tool of discovery."
"Useful but in very few cases will a court make that
difficult a decision. Very easy for the court to 'leave it to
the jury.'"
89. See note 88 supra.
90. When the views of responding attorneys differ significantly according to whether
they primarily represent plaintiffs, defendants, or an even balance of plaintiffs and defend-
ants, that difference will be noted parenthetically following the question.
[Vol. 7
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"Partial summary judgment is most effective. The rule
is useless in federal court."
"Varying uses depending on which side you represent
but not a frequent tool."
"In personal injury and product liability cases it has not
been 'very useful,' however, in complex commercial litiga-
tion, e.g., antitrust, franchise, etc., it is helpful, at least in
limiting the issues."
"I do consider it essential to our system. It is not all that
useful, however."
"Because too many district court judges have no guts."
[Qualifying an affirmative response to "C."]
A-2. Approximately how many summary judgment motions would
you estimate you have been involved in, as proponent or oppo-
nent?
Less than 10: 2. 10-25: 15. Over 25: 9.
A-3. Regarding summary judgment motions you have made,
approximately what percentage would you estimate have been
granted by the trial court?
0-10%: 17 (65%) (50% of responding metro attorneys;
100% of responding outstate attorneys).
11-25%: 3 (12%).
26-50%: 4 (15%).
51-75%: 2 (8%).
A-4. Have you ever had a summary judgment motion denied when
you had essentially no doubt that it had substantial merit?
Often: 7 (56% of defendants' attorneys; 25% of plaintiffs'
attorneys). Sometimes: 11. Rarely: 6. Never: 1.
A-5. Have you ever made a summary judgment motion when you had
substantial doubt about its merit?
Often: 0. Sometimes: 3. Rarely: 16. Never: 6.
A-6. Do you routinely make summary judgment motions when you
believe as a matter of law that they should be granted?
Yes: 13. No: 13.
A-7. If your answer to question 6 is "no," why don't you? (You may
check more than one).
A. Judges are too inclined to deny such motions: 13.
B. Many of my clients haven't been able to afford such
motions: 1.
C. Other:
"All factors weighed, including judge's inclination and
cost."
"A routine denial can establish 'bad law' in the
particular case and prejudice a directed verdict at trial."
19811
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"Strategic reasons."
"Some state court judges are known never to grant
summary judgment."
A-8. How would you rate the Minnesota Supreme Court's attitude on
summary judgment?
A. It reverses summary judgment more often than is warranted:
9.
B. It affirms summary judgment more often than is warranted:
0.
C. About right: I1.
D. Other:
"The court is too willing to find fact issues on facts
which are, in the context of the litigation, basically irrele-
vant or of very marginal relevance."
"It is very inconsistent, tending to decide cases based on
the subject matter and merits of the litigation rather than
on the rules governing summary judgment."
A-9. In general, how would you rate the attitudes of district judges
you have dealt with towards summary judgment?
A. Too many summary judgment motions are denied: 18.
B. Too many summary judgment motions are granted: 1.
C. About right: 3.
D. Other:
"Very reluctant to grant."
"Depends on judge--some deny summary judgment
motions as a matter of course because they believe all cases
should be tried on the merits. Others are open to the mo-
tions and will grant summary judgment if it is an appro-
priate case."
"Some judges simply will not grant summary judgment
no matter if the motion has merit."
"Greatly variable--some judges never grant it. None
grant it too often."
A-10. Are there any ancillary reasons, ite., reasons other than the desire
to obtain summary judgment, for which you have made a motion
for summary judgment? If so, please specify:
"(1) To have the file assigned to a particular judge; and
(2) discovery method."
"To educate the court about the strength of my
positions."
"As a defendant it's sometimes a useful discovery
device."
"I may make a motion for summary judgment in order
to prevent the other side from doing so. By making my
motion first, it requires them to come in and allege factual
(Vol. 7
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issues that prevent the granting of my motion and so im-
pairs their ability to make a motion."
"Obtain information as to the other side's strengths and
weaknesses, smoke out positions, and set the judge up for
later rulings or trial by getting him involved in the mer-
its."
"Discovery."
"Yes-partial summary judgment to narrow issues and
ease proof problems or liability questions at trial. Also, I
have brought motions for summary judgment to push the
parties towards settlement."
"I often use motions for summary judgment to eliminate
some counts. I may make the motion to demonstrate to a
defense client that the case could result in judgment for
plaintiff and to be given settlement authority."
"To force opposing parties to disclose their theory of the
case in greater detail--especially when responses to discov-
ery have been evasive."
"Occasionally to pin the other side down to a position
and discover facts supporting the same."
"To delineate and eliminate issues, when an issue may
be unclear, to try and get an early certification to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, and for leverage in settlement ne-
gotiations."
"Yes-to demonstrate to the other attorneys the
strengths of our legal arguments and force them to start
their legal research early."
"Yes-occasionally useful as a discovery tool, or to force
the opponent to show his hand, or to put settlement pres-
sure on the opponent."
A- 11. Please indicate whether you believe the following statements are
more or less accurate.
A. Many district judges deny summary judgment motions as a
matter of course. Accurate: 21 (one crossed out "many"
and wrote in "some"). Not accurate: 5.
B. Many district judges deny summary judgment motions
primarily because of fear of reversal. Accurate: 11. Not ac-
curate: 13.
C. Generally speaking, it is a waste of time to make a motion
for summary judgment, even where such a motion has in-
trinsic merit as a matter of law. Accurate: 10. Not accu-
rate: 15.
A-12. What are the motives for which you make motions for summary
judgment?
A. To decrease the expense of litigation and avoid a needless
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trial (or to limit the issues in cases of partial summary judg-
ment). Always: 8. Most of the time: 12. Around 50% of
the time: 5. Rarely: 1. Never: 0.
B. To increase the expense of litigation to my opponent.
Always: 0. Most of the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 0.
Rarely: 5. Never: 21.
C. To obtain information from my opponent which may be
difficult to obtain under other procedural rules. Always: 0.
Most of the time: 2. Around 50% of the time: 1. Rarely:
16. Never: 7.
D. To avoid potential malpractice claims. Always: 0. Most of
the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 0. Rarely: 5. Never:
20.
E. To show my client that I am "doing something." Always: 0.
Most of the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 0. Rarely: 5.
Never: 21.
F. Other motives:
"Educate the judge as to the merits of the case."
"Client insists. To set up certified question on
jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal where denial is antici-
pated."
"To prepare a record for appeal."
"To gain settlement authority from defense clients
(generally in commercial litigation)."
"To assess judicial reaction to novel arguments or issues
of first impression."
A-13. For what motives do you believe other attorneys representing
plaintiffs make motions for summary judgment?
A. To decrease the expense of litigation and avoid a needless
trial (or to limit the issues in cases of partial summary judg-
ment). Always: 1. Most of the time: 17. Around 50% of
the time: 5. Rarely: 1. Never: 1.
B. To increase the ultimate expense of the litigation to their
client and thereby primarily benefit themselves financially.
Always: 0. Most of the time: 1. Around 50% of the time: 1.
Rarely: 15. Never: 8.
C. To increase the expense of litigation to their opponents.
Always: 0. Most of the time: 1. Around 50% of the time: 3.
Rarely: 17. Never: 4.
D. To obtain information from their opponents which may be
difficult to obtain under other procedural rules. Always: 0.
Most of the time: 1. Around 50% of the time: 1. Rarely:
19. Never: 4.
E. To avoid potential malpractice claims. Always: 0. Most of
[Vol. 7
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the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 0. Rarely: 16.
Never: 9.
F. To impress their clients that they are "doing something."
Always: 0. Most of the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 4.
Rarely: 18. Never: 3.
G. Other motives:
"Educate the judge."
A-14. For what motives do you believe other attorneys representing de-
fendants make motions for summary judgment?
A. To decrease the expense of litigation and avoid a needless
trial (or to limit the issues in cases of partial summary judg-
ment). Always: 2. Most of the time: 14. Around 50% of
the time: 7. Rarely: 1. Never: 1.
B. To increase the ultimate expense of the litigation to their
client and thereby primarily benefit themselves financially.
Always: 0. Most of the time: 1. Around 50% of the time: 3.
Rarely: 15. Never: 6.
C. To increase the expense of litigation to their opponents.
Always: 0. Most of the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 7.
Rarely: 15. Never: 3.
D. To obtain information from their opponents which may be
difficult to obtain under other procedural rules. Always: 0.
Most of the time: 2. Around 50% of the time: 4. Rarely:
15. Never: 4.
E. To avoid potential malpractice claims. Always: 0. Most of
the time: 0. Around 50% of the time: 1. Rarely: 16.
Never: 8.
F. To show their clients that they are "doing something."
Always: 0. Most of the time: 1. Around 50% of the time: 2.
Rarely: 19. Never: 3.
G. Other motives:
"Educate the judge."
"Avoid jury trial."
A-15. Add any additional comments you wish to make:
"There is a vast difference between state and federal
court in treatment of such motions. The Eighth Circuit
has virtually abolished the rule, in the view of the district
court judges. It is also granted more often outstate than in
Hennepin and Ramsey counties."
"Several years ago I had a summary judgment motion
denied when it was clear to me and the opponent that ac-
cording to the state of the law at that time, the judgment
should have been granted. That would have allowed for
an immediate appeal to the supreme court. The court, af-
ter denying the motion, put the litigants through two bi-
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furcated trials on liability and damages, ultimately
resulting in two supreme court appeals. Eventually the
supreme court found that the statute on which the sum-
mary judgment motion was made was unconstitutional.
Tremendous expense could have been avoided had the
summary judgment motion been granted in the first place.
We could have then taken an early appeal and had that
single issue resolved, saving twenty-two trial days and two
supreme court appeals before getting the final answr
That attitude of unwillingness by the trial bench provided
a very wasteful experience in terms of money and time for
the litigant."
"Summary judgment should always be timed for
hearing before a judge who will listen-many will not. Its
primary utility is the resolution of simple, stark legal ques-
tions, e.g., statute of limitations. The most ignored aspect
of Rule 56 is the requirement that opponents produce
competent evidence in rebuttal. Many judges allow attor-
neys to file affidavits over their own signature. I have seen
motions denied where there was no competent rebuttal on
the basis that the trial might produce evidence in rebut-
tal."
"Trial judges get reversed too often when they grant
summary judgment motions. Consequently, they avoid
them since they can't get reversed if they deny them."
"Plaintiffs can benefit from defendants' summary
judgment motions by pretrial preparation, t*e., it makes
plaintiffs get their case ready for trial."
"Trial courts should be more courageous in granting the
motion where the situation is very clear."
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